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Abstract. Information governance (IG) can play a critical role in reducing the risks of storing, using, sharing, and analysing relevant data/ information related to money laundering (ML) by ensuring effective compliance with national and international regulatory requirements. Most studies to date have only focused on technology and regulatory approaches to address the ML problem. Despite its importance, far too little attention has been paid to the potential role of information governance practices in the ML context. This study explores how various IG practices can aid Omani banks in increasing their capacity for governing ML-related data/ information in a way that enables them to mitigate the risks of ML. The study adopts a collective case study approach, with qualitative data being gathered from three primary sources, including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and document reviews. Thematic analysis (TA) will be used to analyse and code the interview data. The participants in this study were recruited from six commercial banks in Oman using a purposive sampling method. The study is expected to contribute to theory, methodology and practice. 
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Introduction
Money laundering (ML) is a complex and severe financial crime in the world [1–3]. It entails converting illicit proceeds obtained from organised crime (such as drug trafficking and corruption) into legitimate funds [2]. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the total laundered proceeds per year amount to 2% to 5% of global domestic product (GDP), or roughly US$800 billion to US$2 trillion [4]. In their 2019 report, the National Centre for Financial Information (NCFI) of Oman reported an increase of 17.06% in the number of suspicious transactions reports (STRs) received by different reporting entities, including banks, compared with the previous five years – i.e., 2014 to 2019 [5]. Due to globalisation, financial systems are now interconnected [1,3]. This means that offenders can be allowed to spill over into other countries when one country fails to implement sound anti-money laundering governance [6]. Therefore, it affects both the stability of global financial systems and world peace [7,8]. For AML to be effective, best practices and preventive measures need to be implemented to enhance the capacity of financial institutions, which act as the 'frontline' of defence in detecting and combating the risks of ML [6,9,10]. So far, research on ML has mainly focused on technology [9,11–14] and regulatory approaches [15–18]. However, the role of information governance (IG) practices (or IG programs) in mitigating ML risks has received little attention, despite their usefulness in improving the reliability and trustworthiness of risk management information and also organisational performance [19,20]. The term 'information governance' was first used by the UK National Health Service (NHS) [21]. It can broadly be defined as "a collection of capabilities or practices for the creation, capture, valuation, storage, usage, control, access, archival, and deletion of information over its life cycle" [20, p. 2]. 
It is argued that an IG program can reduce the risks and improve the performance of anti-money laundering departments [19,22]. Soares [19] observes that the adoption of IG practices in a large financial institution has led to improve the Know Your Customer (KYC) policies and reduce the number of false positives. Other studies [19,23,24] reported that the implementation of IG programs had enabled bankers to integrate related financial and operational data – such as opening accounts and cash deposits — into a centralised repository, which results in better analysis and assessment of ML risks. Having an integrated approach like IG connects data and helps AML officers detect fraudulent or suspicious activities that cannot otherwise be observed through decentralised repositories [25]. Surprisingly, while IG appears to play a critical role in reducing the risks of ML, only very few empirical investigations have been identified in the current literature. The identified studies do not address the ML problem per se, but they provide a general understanding of IG adoption in the banking industry [19,22,23]. The present study, therefore, aims to fill this research gap by i) enriching our understanding of how to integrate and then share information about money laundering activities within the Omani banking sector, and ii) how an information governance program can aid banks in increasing their capacity for governing this information, so as to be able to mitigate the risks of money-laundering.
Literature review 
The concept of information governance has recently emerged as a response to the dominant focus of information technology (IT) governance, or 'physical artefacts'​[1]​ [26], as well as the increased value of information assets in modern organisations including banks [20,27,28]. Indeed, modern banking systems are actively employing technological solutions to handle risks and scrutinise financial transactions [9,29]. However, managing complex and massive amounts of transactional information like money laundering involve coordinated approaches and mechanisms, especially when that information is seen as a strategic asset for survival in the industry [22]. 
By drawing on an extensive review of IT governance literature, Tallon et al. [20] have proposed a holistic IG framework (see figure 1) based on qualitative data collected from thirty organisations across multiple industries, including financial services. Their framework comprises three key elements: 'antecedents', several procedural, structural and relational practices, and 'consequences'. First, antecedents are subdivided into enablers and inhibiting factors; the former motivate or speed up the adoption of IG practices in an organisation, while the latter create obstacles that constrain or limit their capacity or use. Second, the composition of IG practices involves procedures for the allocation of decision rights; policies for ensuring effective management of information – such as backups, retention periods and information sharing – plus relational practices for enhancing collaboration and training among critical stakeholders. Lastly, the study concludes that the increased use of IG practices across all participating firms leads to intermediate-level effects and risk mitigation. Tallon et al.'s [20] framework serves as an important benchmark in IG literature because it is comprehensive and based on empirical evidence, unlike other frameworks that are limited for a specific organisation or context [e.g., 21, 31, 32, 33]. A more recent study by Abraham, Schneider, and Brocke [30] have further extended the framework of Tallon et al. [20] by adding components for inter-organisational data sharing and data ecosystem aspects. Given that risk mitigation is the goal for IG implementation in an ML context, Tallon et al.'s framework serve as a theoretical lens and guidance for this study. 

Fig. 1. The theoretical framework of the study [20]
In their analysis of recent case studies of banks' failures and scandals, Brien and Dixon [34] show how accountability and governance have become an integral part of AML solutions in contemporary banking. Research shows that major financial institutions have failed to fulfil established regulatory requirements due to information being stored in distributed IT systems with partial or no integration, constraining their ability to ensure data consistency [24]. Of course, with the increased volume and complexity of illicit ML transactions [32,33], there is a definite need for a holistic approach like IG that can facilitate integration and information sharing across different business functions [23,25]. It is a widely held view that collecting reliable and accurate information from the customer during the KYC process can serve as a critical preventive measure against ML activities, which protects banks from reputational, operational and legal risks [2,16,17,34]. 
Soares [19] and Faria et al. [22] have highlighted the role of the IG program in improving the efficiency of the KYC process by reducing the time and effort spent on customer identification. To demonstrate this, Soares provides a real example of a large bank that successfully integrated multiple account-opening processes into a common customer identification programme, enabling customer identity and relevant records to be verified using a unique identifier—i.e., a social security number. He further showed how IG practices help reduce the number of 'false positives' by automating checking customer names against suspects' sanctions list. The relevant literature review points to a range of possible effects that IG may have on ML. Broadly, there is some evidence to suggest that the adoption of an IG program in the banking industry has the potential to improve compliance with regulations [22,35], optimise performance [23], reduce risks [19,20] and enhance the security of information [36]. In the context of ML, IG can reduce operating costs and improve the performance of the AML department through better management of KYC/customer identification programmes [19]. Despite its importance, our review indicates that the concept of IG is still 'immature' in the banking sector, although information is regarded as a critical strategic asset [22]. A search of academic sources revealed only three studies [19, 22, 23] that have attempted to investigate the role of IG in the banking sector in general. However, no single empirical investigation was found that specifically explored IG in the context of ML. This is the gap that this research will try to address.  
Methodology 
The qualitative case study design was deemed particularly suitable for addressing the questions of this research. Given the limited theoretical knowledge about IG practices existing in the Omani banking sector, the phenomenon under investigation cannot be investigated outside its real-life context without capturing the experiences from its key actors (i.e., bankers and regulators). Also, adopting the case study design would allow the researcher to generate theories from practice by engaging in direct conversation with key actors within their real-world context, and thereby gaining a deeper understanding of the problem under investigation. It further enables the research questions to be answered with a full exploration of the phenomenon's complexities by gathering various evidence from multiple data sources, including interviews, focus groups, and documents analysis. The banking sector of Oman is chosen as the research context, where six banks are selected as the units of analysis (cases), namely (1) Bank Muscat; (2) National Bank of Oman; (3) Bank Dhofar; (4) Sohar International Bank; (5) Oman Arab Bank; and (6) HSBC Oman Bank. These banks have been selected not only because they have unrivalled leading positions in Oman, but also, according to the National Centre of Financial Information (NCFI) of Oman, these banks are witnessing a significant increase in money laundering cases​[2]​.
Furthermore, these banks have the largest networks of branches (both national and international). This makes them more vulnerable to financial crimes like ML, due to the massive amount of transactional information. Therefore, it is more likely that these banks could benefit from IG practices to manage their information and safeguard their reputations in the industry. 
Apart from these banks, Central bank of Oman (CBO) was selected as a pilot study to assess the feasibility of the proposed methods/or design, but also to gain a holistic understanding of latest development and issues about the national initiative of data integration and information sharing across various financial institutions in Oman. Three data collection methods will be applied in this research, including semi-structured interviews (phase 1), focus groups (phase 2), and document reviews. At the first stage, semi-structured interviews (a mixture of face-to-face and virtual interviews) will be conducted to investigate the actors' perspectives and their experiences regarding the current practices being applied to govern relevant ML data/ information within their bank. The focus group method will then be applied at the second stage to explore collective perceptions and experiences among different professional groups from different banks. Public and private documents (e.g., minutes of meetings, annual reports, and memos) will be collected and reviewed at different stages of the research project to increase the potential for data triangulation through multiple data collection methods. 




This study is expected to contribute to theory, methodology and practice. For theory, the study's outcome will contribute to the existing body of knowledge in Information Studies by extending the theory of information governance through uncovering the antecedent factors (both enablers and inhibitors) that may motivate or constrain the adoption of IG practices for ML in the Omani banking sector. Methodologically, this study will address some of the methodological limitations reported by previous research [e.g., 20] that only involved Chief Information Officers (CIOs) in the study sample. In response to this limitation, this study will involve key stakeholders from different organisational levels, including chief information officers (CIOs), IG/IT managers, and AML officers. For practice, it is expected that this research will add value by providing practitioners in banks and regulators with a detailed description of best practices based on IG that can be used to improve their internal AML policies and procedures. Regulators such as central banks can employ the research outcomes to improve banks' capacity in sharing relevant ML data/ information by, for example, enacting new policies that enable inter-collaboration among various financial institutions without impairing the confidentiality and privacy of customer information.
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^1	  Physical artefacts may include hardware, networks or computers
^2	  See https://fiu.gov.om/files/NCFI_Annual_Report_July_2020_En.pdf
^3	  See https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.112655!/file/General-Principles-and-Statements.pdf
